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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
HELEN S. BROADBENT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Court of Appeals
No. 930455-CA

vs.

Priority 15

ROSS BROADBENT,
Defendant/Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3
Rule 3.
(a)

Appeal as of right: how taken
An appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile,
or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final
orders
and
judgments, except
as
otherwise
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the trial court within the time
allowed by Rule 4. . . .
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT TIMELY FILED HIS
NOTICE OF APPEAL RELATIVE
TO THE ORDER ENTERED
JANUARY 14, 1993

In her brief, Plaintiff

Helen

Schumann

Broadbent

("Ms.

Broadbent") first argues that Defendant Ross Broadbent

("Mr.

Broadbent") did not timely file his notice of appeal relative to

1

the order of the trial court entered

January

14, 1993

(the

"January 1993 Order"),
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in
relevant part:
An appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile,
or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final
orders
and
judgments, except
as
otherwise
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the trial court within the time
allowed by Rule 4.

Utah R. App. Pro, 3(a) (emphasis added).

The final order or

judgment provision of Rule 3 "precludes a party from taking an
appeal from any orders or judgments that are not final" except
when

the

order

or

judgment

in

question

is

eligible

for

certification under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or the
appellate court grants permission for an interlocutory appeal,
A, J, Mackay Co, v. Okland Const, Co,, 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah
1991).

Ms, Broadbent

January 1993 Order.

did

not request

certification

of the

In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d

538 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy
between the parties litigant. . . . [A] judgment
which disposes of fewer than all of the causes of
action alleged in the plaintifffs complaint is
not a final judgment from which an appeal may be
taken.
Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
In this case, it is clear that the January 1993 Order was
not

a

final

order.

Numerous
2

issues

had

still

not

been

completely resolved at the time of the entry of the January 1993
Order.

For example, the central issue of the case, the amount

allegedly owed by Mr. Broadbent to Ms. Broadbent for support
arrearages, had not been adjudicated.

After the January 1993

Order was entered, the trial court set an evidentiary hearing for
the express purpose of determining the amount, if any, owed by
Mr. Broadbent to Ms. Broadbent under the Decree of Divorce.

R.

317-332.

in

The trial court held

February and March 1993.

that evidentiary

R. 1184-1416.

hearing

On June 28, 1993, the

trial court ended the controversy between the parties by entering
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Court
(the

"June

Judgment").

1993

Order")

and

its

R. 697-706, 716-717.

Judgment

(the

"June

1993

The June 1993 Order and June

1993 Judgment constitute the final order and judgment in this
case.

On July 9, 1993, Mr. Broadbent timely filed his notice of

appeal.
In conclusion, Mr. Broadbent timely filed his notice of
appeal.

Properly before this Court on appeal are the rulings of

the trial court contained in the January 1993 Order, the June
1993 Order and the June 1993 Judgment.

3

II.
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS AN
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT AS IT RELATES TO
ALIMONY AND, AS IT RELATES TO CHILD
SUPPORT, TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT
OR VALUE DERIVED BY MS. BROADBENT
In Point II of her brief, Ms. Broadbent cites, as did Mr,
Broadbent, several Utah cases for the proposition of law that a
child's right to support cannot be bartered away, estopped or
defeated

by the parties.

However, Ms. Broadbent

completely

ignores and cites no case in opposition to the cases of Baggs v.
Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) and French v. Johnson, 401
P. 2d

315

(Utah

1965),

in which

the Utah

Supreme

Court

has

recognized that there are circumstances where a party may be
estopped from collecting child support.

Mr. Broadbent is not

attempting to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement as
its relates to his child support obligation.

Mr. Broadbent is,

however, entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the benefit
derived by Ms. Broadbent under the Settlement Agreement, which
amount should be credited against Mr. Broadbent's child support
obligation.

The

trial

court

denied

Mr.

Broadbent

that

evidentiary hearing.
Ms. Broadbent also completely ignores and cites no case in
opposition to the case of Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P. 2d 127 (Utah
1977), in which the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the right
of

former spouses to bargain, compromise and

obligations.

Id. at 128.

settle

alimony

Ms. Broadbent cites the case of Baggs

4

v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), for the proposition that
the Settlement Agreement provided no new consideration,

Baggs

is, however, inapposite in that it dealt only with child support
obligations,

not

alimony.

Under

Gulley,

the

terms

of

the

Settlement Agreement constituted adequate consideration for the
compromise,

settlement

and

satisfaction

of

Mr.

alimony obligations under the Decree of Divorce.

Broadbent's
Accordingly,

the Settlement Agreement should be enforced to that extent.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PRECLUDED
MR. BROADBENT FROM PRESENTING
EVIDENCE AS TO HIS PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AND THE BENEFIT DERIVED BY
MS. BROADBENT THEREUNDER
Ms. Broadbent next argues that Mr. Broadbent was not denied
an opportunity to present evidence regarding the payment of his
alimony and child support obligations.
in

her

argument

determine

to

the amount

the

extent

a

of cash paid

Broadbent toward those obligations.

Ms. Broadbent is correct

hearing

was

conducted

by Mr. Broadbent

to

to Ms.

Ms. Broadbent is incorrect,

however, in her assertion to the extent a hearing was conducted
to determine the in-kind benefits derived by Ms. Broadbent under
the Settlement Agreement.

Equity mandates that Mr. Broadbent be

given credit against his alimony and child support obligations
for such in-kind benefits derived by Ms. Broadbent.

5

On November 23, 1992, the trial court heard argument on Mr.
Broadbent's objection to a writ of garnishment that had been
issued.

R.

established

1168-1183.
the procedure

In

the

hearing,

to decide

the

enforceability of the Settlement Agreement.

the

legal

trial

issue of

the

In that hearing the

trial court stated:
THE COURT: I agree. Ms. Douglas, we can't
proceed in this fashion today. All anybody
had coming here to court today was a request
for hearing saying judgment hadn't been
satisfied, and certainly counsel can't be
prepared to respond to proffer today.
Assuming that this settlement stipulation is
otherwise enforceable, it sounds to me like
you've got a question of fact that is going
to require a hearing.
MS. DOUGLAS:
Your Honor, for the court's
clarification, the $13,000 that I was noting
to the Court, because that figure was stated
in the writ of garnishment and there was a
statement by Mr. Thompson that we were
attempting to collect some judgments that he
was not, that we were attempting to stop
garnishment on a post 1987 judgment, and
that's the issue I was attempting to
address.
THE COURT: Well, it still sounds to me like
-- assuming that this settlement agreement
is legally enforceable, that there is a -at least the plaintiff is entitled to notice
before we get to the hearing what your
address is going to be so they can respond
to it.
I really don't think there's any
alternative but to schedule a hearing. But
before we do that, Counsel, I'm going to
require that you brief the legal aspect and
I would be interested in the Social Services
vs. Adams.
If it's contrary to what the
Supreme Court has said maybe later in time but if it's different than what the
Supreme Court has said it's valueless as far
as I'm concerned.
The Supreme Court is

6

court

still the highest court in the State, so we
need to take a look at the legal issue.
So, here's the way I propose we handle
this. The agreement's in the file and some
legal reason to enforce it, so we'll take as
a given everybody signing this because
there's no dispute as to that.
The
settlement agreement was filed in court
April 18th, 1990.
And let me ask the
plaintiff
to
file your opening
legal
memoranda with regard to the enforceability
or lack thereof, to raise any issues as
you've talked about, that is, it's invalid
as
against
public
policy,
lack
of
consideration, failure of consideration.
Ms. Douglas, you can respond and then
I'll give the plaintiff an opportunity to
reply. If I'm satisfied that the contract,
after I read the memoranda, is legally
enforceable and that it doesn't fail for
lack of consideration as a matter of law,
that it's precisely the same obligations
that were upon the divorce decree, if it's
just a reaffirmation of what was agreed to
do, what he was told to do earlier in the
divorce
decree,
then
there's
no
consideration.
But assuming those two
issues aren't positive, then, if, based upon
the affidavits you filed in support of your
respective positions on the consideration
failure thereof, I'll schedule the matter
for an evidentiary hearing and you can put
on whatever testimony is appropriate as to
whether or not the agreement has been
complied with.
R. 1177-1179 (emphasis added).
Based on the memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties,
on December 30, 1992, the trial court entered its Minute Entry
and found that Mr. Broadbent's objection to the issuance of the
writs of garnishment was without merit on the grounds that the
Settlement Agreement was

"invalid and without any legitimate

7

consideration" and that the "Settlement Agreement did not result
in

a

court

order,

and

this

Court

has

not

authorized

the

substitution of vending machines for child support, even if the
parties otherwise legitimately agree[d]."

R. 183-185.

Pursuant

to the Minute Entry, the trial court entered the January 1993
Order.

Finding

of

fact

no.

5 of

the

January

1993

Order

specifically provides that "Plaintiff received no benefit under
the Settlement Agreement."

R. 233.

There was and is, however,

absolutely no evidence in the record supporting that finding.
Subsequently,

Mr.

Broadbent

was

prohibited

from

presenting

evidence to challenge that finding.
In at least three subsequent hearings the trial court stated
that

it would

Agreement.

not take evidence

relative

to the

Settlement

In a hearing on January 25, 1993, the trial court

stated:
THE COURT: Well, procedurally, I think the
defendant is correct, the amount of the
judgment pursuant to the hearing that was
held earlier, was not pursuant to an
evidentiary hearing where witnesses were
called and cross-examination was had. And
when the amount is calculated as it is here,
as to the amount of arrearage, then that's a
legitimate request.
This matter was not
scheduled for an evidentiary hearing today.
Wasn't scheduled for an evidentiary hearing
before. If we have to have an evidentiary
hearing, then we will. Maybe it will come
out the same way, but in any event it still
has to be an evidentiary hearing so I can
consider all the evidence from both sides.
But that does not mean, however, that I am
going to revisit the issues of whether or
not this purported stipulation between the
parties as to the child support and other

8

things are all contrary to the divorce
decree.
It is not.
1 have decided that
issue. So what 1 am going to do, 1 am going
to set the matter for an evidence hearing on
the issue of the amount of the judgment upon
which the executions have issued.
I will
not void or vacate the executions because 1
have not yet vacated or voided judgment, and
the amount, as to its effect.
I will not
consider any evidence.
1 have made my
decision with regard to whether or not the
stipulation
between
the
parties
is
enforceable and it is not.
If someone
doesnft like that, they can appeal it. The
long and short of it is I think the
defendant ought to be given an opportunity
to cross-examine and present evidence.
Might be appropriate in regard to the amount
of arrearages that are due. We will conduct
an evidentiary hearing on that limited scope
only.
(emphasis added). 1

R.

Similarly in the hearing of February 8, 1993, the trial
court stated:
THE COURT: Let me see. The order that was
prepared, and
I assume there was no
objections — I didn't see one -- I have not
yet signed this order that Ms. Douglas
prepared. It says both parties are ordered
to appear before this Court today for an
evidentiary hearing to determine the amount
of judgment which the plaintiff should be
entitled to.
I just said we wouldn't revisit the issue as to whether the parties
had an enforceable stipulation.
I ? ve
already decided that.
R. 1187-1188.

x

As of the date Mr. Broadbent filed his reply brief, the
transcript of the hearing of January 25, 1993, had not been
included in the record.
Counsel for Mr. Broadbent has made
arrangements with the clerk of the trial court to correct this
oversight. The quoted portion is found at pages 11 and 12 of the
transcript.
9

Finally, in the hearing of March 8, 1993, the trial court
stated:
MS. DOUGLAS:
Your Honor, in my judgment,
the Court would have to go back to the Brown
decision which states that if the parties
executed a stipulation, and submitted it to
the Court -THE COURT:
insufficient.
appeal me.

I've
If

already ruled that's
you don't like that,

THE COURT: I'll hang on to it. I want your
final papers by five o'clock on Wednesday.
If I don't get them by five o'clock on
Wednesday, I won't consider them.
All I
want to see from you in writing is a brief
statement as to what you believe, for
example, what the plaintiff believes she's
entitled to, and what documents support, and
I want included in there, I'm looking at
final figures. I want what you claim in the
way of judgment, what's been satisfied, what
hasn't, and as far as the defendant's
concerned, all I want to see is what credits
he thinks he's entitled to.
I don't want
the issue of the stipulation litigated
again, hashed around again. I didn't accept
the stipulation. It wasn't my stipulation,
and I don't accept it.
And I've already
ruled on it. I want to see those Wednesday
at five. I'll look for them then. We'll be
in recess.
R. at 156-158.
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the Settlement
Agreement was "invalid."

In three subsequent hearings, the trial

court prohibited Mr. Broadbent from presenting any evidence on
the

benefit

derived

by

Ms.

Broadbent

10

under

the

Settlement

Agreement,

which

benefit

should

be

credited

against

Mr.

Broadbentfs child support and alimony obligations.
In

her

assertion

brief,

that

Ms.

Broadbent

"Appellant

decided

also
not

evidence when he saw on the Exhibit

makes
to

the

present

ludicrous
any

such

List that Appellee was

prepared to expose his 'payment in the form of vending machines'
defense as a hoax."

Appellee's Brief at 14-15.

To begin with,

the exhibit list is maintained by the clerk of the trial court
and neither Mr. Broadbent nor his trial counsel saw the exhibit
list.

Neither Mr. Broadbent nor his trial counsel had knowledge

of the exhibits Ms. Broadbent planned to introduce into evidence.
Finally, the exhibits referred to by Ms. Broadbent are not even
part of the record in this case.

As indicated, Ms. Broadbent's

assertion is ludicrous.
In summary, the prohibition of the trial court to allow a
full evidentiary hearing on the benefit derived by Ms. Broadbent
under the Settlement Agreement constitutes a clear denial of Mr.
Broadbent's due process rights.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED
IN NUMEROUS RESPECTS RELATIVE
TO THE ENTRY OF THE JUNE 1993
ORDER AND JUDGMENT.
In Point IV of her brief, Ms. Broadbent first argues that
Mr.

Broadbent

is

seeking

a

trial

"augmentation" of the 1987 Judgment.

11

de

novo

relative

to

the

Such is not the case.

Mr.

Broadbent is merely attempting to correct the facial errors in
the January 1993 Order relative to such items as the compounding
of interest, the miscalculation of interest and the awarding of
costs.
Ms. Broadbent next argues that "the Trial Court was free to
exercise its discretion under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2756 in awarding attorney's fees in this case.
at 16.

Brief of Appellee

No claim was ever made by Ms. Broadbent for an award of

attorney's fees pursuant to that statutory section and, indeed,
the trial court made no findings required for such an award.

See

Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).
Finally, Ms. Broadbent asserts that "Appellant engages in
whining over amounts awarded by the Trial Court and again seeks
trial de novo" relative to certain reimbursement claims.
of Appellee at 18.

Brief

Ms. Broadbent then argues that the "Trial

Court properly found that 'books, flags, school pictures, flash
cards, overdue book fees, magazine subscriptions, crafts and
clothing' were indeed, expenses related to lessons and summer
school."

Id.

The same trial court judge concluded in the same

case a few months later that such expenditures were not subject
to reimbursement by Mr. Broadbent to Ms. Broadbent under the
Decree of Divorce.

One of the two decisions must be in error.

12

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the January 1993 Order, the June
1993 Order and the June 1993 Judgment should be reversed and
remanded to the trial court for further evidentiary hearing.
DATED this /J/%

day of August 1994.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

CLARK W. S E S S I O N S
DEAN C. ANDREASEN

7

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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On this
mailed
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day of August 1994, I hereby caused to be
first-class

mail,

postage
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true

and
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following:
James L. Thompson, E s q ,
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